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The Problem with Negligence 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When an individual is negligent and as a result injures someone else, we 
tend to hold her responsible for those injuries and judge her blamewor-
thy. Indeed, blaming people for their negligence, or thoughtlessness, or 
carelessness, is an all too common occurrence. It is quite surprising, then, 
that very little has been said about responsibility for negligently pro-
duced harms outside of discussions in legal theory. In fact, the literature 
on moral responsibility has been virtually silent on the matter.1 Given our 
readiness to blame negligent agents and the pervasiveness of accusations 
of thoughtlessness or carelessness in our lives, negligence remains an 
area that any theory of responsibility must address one way or another.2 
 This paper argues for two conclusions. First, the fact that negligence 
is characterized by the absence of certain conscious mental states, rather 
than by any positive feature, poses a deep and general problem to any 
theory of responsibility. I show that tracing, the primary tool in the litera-
ture for explaining responsibility in the absence of a conscious mental 
element, is inadequate: though tracing works in some related cases, it 
can’t work for negligence, as I understand it. 
 Second, the paper argues that it is difficult to distinguish between 
negligence and simple inadvertence. This fact poses a problem, since we 
have good reason for thinking that inadvertence counts as an excuse, 
whereas negligence is generally thought not to excuse. I argue that the 
parallels between negligence and inadvertence suggest that negligent 
agents are not responsible for the harms they produce. 
                                                 
 1One especially notable exception is Michael Zimmerman, “Negligence and Moral 
Responsibility,” Noûs 20 (1986): 199-218. But Zimmerman’s treatment begins by giving 
an overly restrictive gloss on negligence, one characterized by the agent’s previous con-
sideration of the possibility of harm, and then arguing that we can explain responsibility 
in such cases. Given this artificial scope, he misses a good many, I would even say most, 
cases of negligence, wherein the agent never before consciously considered the risk of 
harm such conduct might pose. 
 2Manuel Vargas has also emphasized this point. See his “The Trouble With Tracing,” 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (2005): 269-91, esp. p. 283. 
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 The arguments for these conclusions are advanced in sections 2 and 4, 
respectively. Section 3 illustrates why tracing’s failure is important. And 
section 5 proposes an alternative model for distinguishing between neg-
ligence and inadvertence that does justice to our intuitions, while holding 
that in neither case is the agent morally responsible. 
 
 
2. The Nature of Negligence 
 
Negligence constitutes a special class of cases. Unlike harms that agents 
bring about on purpose, or knowingly, or even recklessly, negligently 
produced harms are brought about because of an absence of care. Negli-
gent agents risk harm by not taking sufficient care in acting. They fail to 
pay appropriate attention to the possible consequences of their conduct, 
and thus substantially increase the risk of harm such conduct poses. For 
example, suppose that Nate, tired from waking up early, is backing out of 
his driveway. His thoughts turn to his meetings that day, and his attention 
is partially focused on a radio commercial. Due to his inattention, Nate 
doesn’t see a child walking to school and so hits him, breaking the 
child’s leg. Nate is negligent: he fails to pay proper attention to what he 
is doing and so risks harm to others, a risk that is unfortunately realized. 
Moreover, Nate seems both responsible and blameworthy for his negli-
gent conduct. He is at fault because he didn’t pay attention, and as a re-
sult is morally responsible for the child’s injuries. 
 What is noteworthy about Nate’s case is that lots of activities risk 
harm. But negligence is unique in that it does not require consciously 
entertaining the risk one’s conduct poses. It only has to be the case that 
one’s conduct is unreasonably risky, not that one acted in the recognition 
that it was so. Thus, negligence abandons the element of conscious con-
sideration often required for blameworthy conduct. To do x negligently 
is to do x as a result of not consciously entertaining the risk of x posed by 
one’s directly intended conduct and refraining from (or adequately modi-
fying) that conduct. Thus, we should consider negligence as character-
ized by the failure to consider the risk. The hallmark of negligence is the 
lack of a conscious element. 
 My characterization is meant to capture a wide range of ordinary 
cases, but for all that, it is also semi-stipulative. There is no doubt, I 
think, that we do blame people for harms they bring about due to their 
unconscious inattention. I’m calling such agents “negligent.” Of course, 
there may be other linguistically legitimate uses of “negligence” (and its 
cognates) than mine here; naturally, my arguments won’t necessarily 
extend to such cases. But I don’t think it controversial that agents who 
are careless, thoughtless, or inattentive, and cause harm as a result, are 
blamed (and judged blameworthy) for that harm. So even if “negligence” 
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can be treated more broadly to include cases outside my characterization, 
this does little to blunt the scope of the problems I raise here.3 
 The problem with negligence begins with the simple observation that 
while negligence is characterized by the lack of a conscious mental ele-
ment, paradigmatic cases of responsibility seem to require at least some 
conscious mental element tying the agent to the outcome in question.4 If I 
decide to stab someone, and then stab him intentionally, then I am re-
sponsible for doing so at least partially because I did so intentionally and 
with full awareness. Indeed, some of our most common excuses to blame 
are considerations that show that some outcome was unintentional or that 
the agent wasn’t aware of what he was doing (subject to certain con-
straints).5 So if Negligent Nate is responsible for the child’s injuries, but 
has no conscious mental state tying him to those injuries, we need some 
special explanation for how this could be so. 
 If we are to be responsible for the products of our negligence, as Neg-
ligent Nate’s6 case suggests, then it must be that responsibility doesn’t 
always require some connecting conscious mental state. This is no spe-
cial problem, one might think, because we already have in the literature a 
strategy for explaining responsibility in the absence of a conscious men-
tal element. We call it tracing, because responsibility for some conduct 
without the conscious mental element can be “traced back” to some pre-
vious decision or action that does have the conscious mental element. For 
example, Sven is drinking at a bar, and has one (or maybe more) too 
many. Sven is sloshed. Nevertheless, he drives toward home. En route, 
and due to his drunkenness, he hits a family sedan, seriously injuring all 
four passengers. Suppose that Sven is sufficiently intoxicated that he 
lacks the relevant conscious mental states for responsibility at the time of 
the crash. If we want to maintain that Sven is still responsible for hitting 
the sedan, then his responsibility for that must be located elsewhere. This 
is where tracing comes in. We can trace his responsibility for the crash to 
his responsibility for a prior act (or condition) that contributed to the 
crash. Sloshed Sven elects to drink to excess, and as a result of this 
choice, he hits and injures a number of people. His choice left him drunk, 
and therefore severely impaired with respect to his ability to control his 
                                                 
 3I should also note that on my characterization of negligence, an agent can be negli-
gent without actually causing any harm. If Nate backs out of the driveway without look-
ing and doesn’t hit anything, he is still negligent, for he still fails to consider the risk his 
conduct poses. 
 4I take paradigmatic cases of responsibility to be cases of fully intentional action by 
competent agents. In such a case, an agent S brings about x by A-ing, and S intended to 
bring about x by A-ing. 
 5This is a point I will return to in detail in section 4. 
 6Negligent Nate’s name here is not meant to suggest a general character trait, but 
merely to help remind the reader of the specifics of the case when it is later brought up. 
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conduct. In this case we can say that the initial choice creates a condition 
of impairment that later clearly contributes to some harm. The above is, 
roughly, the structure of tracing.7 
 It is worth noting that this is a general way of explaining cases like 
Sven’s. It is a strategy that can be adopted by all theories of responsibil-
ity to handle cases in which the usually requisite mental states are not 
present. We can ascribe responsibility for the harm so long as we can 
trace the harm back to some prior action that did include the relevant 
conscious mental element. Then all that’s required is that the agent satis-
fied the conditions on responsibility for that prior choice or action, and 
responsibility can be transmitted to the later outcome.8 Tracing works, 
then, only when the prior action meets two conditions: (1) the agent is 
responsible for that action; and, (2) that action caused the agent to fail to 
satisfy the conditions on responsibility for the later action.9 
 Tracing plainly will not work, however, in cases of negligence, for in 
such cases it is difficult to demonstrate what the initial choice is. Sloshed 
Sven’s accident is largely due to his drunkenness, for which, by hypothe-
sis, he was responsible.10 Tracing claims that in such circumstances re-
sponsibility is transmitted to (at least some of) the outcomes produced by 
his drunkenness, even if at the time of those later actions Sven lacks the 
conditions normally required for responsibility. This is because Sven, 
                                                 
 7At least as it applies in the case of negligence. “Tracing” is a broad label used for a 
variety of appeals to the importance of an agent’s history on his present responsibility. 
This broad notion has been an explicit interest of theories at least since Daniel Dennett, 
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT 
Press, 1984), and especially in responses to that work in Laura Waddell Ekstrom, Free 
Will: A Philosophical Study (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000), John Fischer and Mark 
Ravizza, Responsibility and Control (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 
and Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
The core notion is also discussed by Peter van Inwagen, “When the Will Is Not Free,” 
Philosophical Studies 75 (1994): 95-113, and, in response, by Gordon Pettit, “Are We 
Rarely Free? A Response to Restrictivism,” Philosophical Studies 107 (2002): 219-37, 
and David Vander Laan, “A Regress Argument for Restrictive Incompatibilism,” Phi-
losophical Studies 103 (2001): 201-15. But more recently, the focus on tracing has been 
as represented in the text, as a tool for explaining responsibility in cases in which the 
agent presently lacks the conscious mental states typically present in paradigmatic cases 
of responsibility. See John Fischer and Neal Tognazzini, “The Truth About Tracing,” 
Noûs 43 (2009), in press; Michael McKenna, “Putting the Lie on the Control Condition 
for Moral Responsibility,” Philosophical Studies 139 (2008): 29-37; and Vargas, “The 
Trouble With Tracing.” 
 8The “can” here is important; tracing merely allows us to explain how an agent can 
be responsible for the subsequent harm, not that he must be. 
 9There is a related discussion in legal theory that concerns “prior choice” accounts of 
criminal liability. For a discussion of these accounts, see Stephen Garvey, “What’s 
Wrong with Involuntary Manslaughter?” Texas Law Review 85 (2007): 333-83. 
 10If one doubts his responsibility, we’ll just have to come up with another case, since 
his will no longer illustrate how tracing is supposed to work. 
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roughly, chooses to get drunk. Contrast this case with Negligent Nate. He 
doesn’t choose to be inattentive, nor does he do anything else for which 
he is responsible that also obviously creates the condition of his inatten-
tiveness. First, recall that the carelessness associated with negligence is 
characterized by the lack of a conscious awareness of potential harm. It 
is not the disregarding of any consideration nor does it involve the reali-
zation of risk. Negligence is crucially defined by the absence of consid-
eration, not its conscious dismissal. Second, we need to consider the po-
tential contributing factors to his unawareness. In the example as stated, 
Nate is groggy, part of his attention is focused on his meetings that day, 
and he is somewhat distracted by the radio. These do not seem to resem-
ble choices in the way that Sven’s continued drinking is a choice. At the 
very least, one needs to show how these three factors would create a 
condition of carelessness (as Sven’s drinking creates his drunkenness), 
one characterized by its nonconscious nature. 
 Nate plausibly does not choose to think about his meetings that day, 
nor is it obvious that such thinking would lead one to be inattentive. Of-
ten thoughts simply occur to us, and it is certainly common to have 
thoughts about one’s upcoming day just “rise to the surface” of con-
scious attention. It also doesn’t seem as though Nate chooses to be 
groggy. He may choose to go to bed at a given time, and also to wake up 
(or at least get up), but we need not suppose that this entails he chooses 
to be groggy. Perhaps he got plenty of sleep and allotted plenty of time to 
“wake up” before leaving. It could nevertheless be the case that despite 
his precautions he is still groggy when he leaves the house. It also isn’t 
clear that he chooses to drive while groggy; that is, he may not realize 
that he is groggy. And if he doesn’t realize it, and he took the aforemen-
tioned reasonable steps to avoid grogginess, this would seem sufficient 
for undermining his responsibility for his grogginess. Lastly, though he 
may choose to turn on the radio, he doesn’t choose to be distracted by it. 
Often background music or commercials can simply grab hold of our 
attention, even when we wish them not to, and it can be a hard matter to 
predict when this will be the case. 
 Even if we think that Nate should have done more to guard against 
distraction, we could simply modify the case to remove the worries. Per-
haps he is distracted by the sunrise, or a bird nearby, instead of the radio. 
Perhaps he isn’t even groggy; he just gets distracted or otherwise fails to 
pay attention and so hits the child. The point is that simply failing to look 
behind him and hitting the child will be sufficient to demonstrate negli-
gence, but nevertheless there will be no conscious choice to trace respon-
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sibility back to. Thus, it seems tracing is an insufficient explanation for 
Nate’s responsibility for the negligently produced harm.11 
 
 
3. The Importance of the Failure of Tracing 
 
If I’m right, then we can’t appeal to tracing, the standard explanation for 
nonparadigmatic cases, to explain responsibility in instances of negli-
gence. It follows that if we are unable to give a general explanation of 
responsibility that can account for cases involving negligence, either neg-
ligence requires an exceptional ad hoc explanation, or else we ought to 
reject the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they 
bring about. In this section, I first argue that the most dominant general 
account of responsibility on offer cannot handle negligence cases in the 
same way as standard cases of action, but is forced to give a disjunctive 
explanation. I then argue that such an account of responsibility in negli-
gence cases would be objectionably ad hoc. 
 Explanation by tracing is an attempt to extend a general account of 
responsibility to cases involving negligence. Tracing tries to explain all 
cases in which the relevant conscious states are absent by reference to 
those same conscious states in some prior action. Tracing purports to 
show how cases of paradigmatic responsible action and Sloshed Sven’s 
case are alike, and how this similarity explains responsibility in both 
cases. But tracing cannot bridge the gap between Sloshed Sven and Neg-
ligent Nate. Nate lacks the conscious mental element and there is nothing 
to trace back to. So the problem isn’t just that tracing fails to explain re-
sponsibility in cases of negligence, it is that whatever the explanation is 
for negligence, if negligent agents are responsible, then the explanation 
should appeal to the same considerations as the explanation of responsi-
bility both in cases like Sven’s and in cases of paradigmatic responsible 
action. But this looks like a very unpromising project, for it seems that 
responsibility in paradigmatic cases is (at least in part) due to the pres-
ence of certain conscious mental states, just those sorts of states the ab-
sence of which characterizes negligence and to which tracing is supposed 
to trace back. 
 But perhaps there is an alternative general explanation of responsibil-
                                                 
 11Steven Sverdlik argues that agents can be “culpable” for negligence even in the 
absence of prior choices. Instead, he claims that responsibility is explained by the fact 
that the agent could have engaged in “moral reflection” that would have exposed the risk 
of harm. See Steven Sverdlik, “Pure Negligence,” American Philosophical Quarterly 30 
(1993): 137-49. (In this respect he mirrors Hart; see n. 19 below.) Sverdlik and I agree 
that tracing is insufficient to explain responsibility in cases of negligence, and disagree 
about negligent agents being responsible. The reasons for this disagreement will be made 
clear below. 
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ity that one might appeal to. There is a family of views for explaining 
responsibility that gives priority not to conscious mental states, but rather 
to the quality of will an agent’s conduct “manifests.”12 On this view, that 
an agent’s conduct manifests an ill quality of will is sufficient for dem-
onstrating responsibility. If Mad Max punches out the bartender, then 
this conduct manifests a quality of ill will on Max’s part toward the bar-
tender. The upshot for our purposes is that conduct that isn’t chosen can 
still plausibly manifest qualities of will. For instance,13 a husband who 
routinely fails to consider his wife’s interests and to at least occasionally 
place them above his own seems to express some quality of ill will to-
ward her. In another example, repeatedly forgetting a close friend’s birth-
day seems to manifest a lack of consideration toward him. When we do 
things that manifest ill qualities of will, so the view goes, we are the le-
gitimate targets of certain kinds of criticism on the basis of that conduct 
(the kinds of criticism intimately associated with responsibility).14 
 One might think that such views have an easier time explaining negli-
gence. It doesn’t matter that Negligent Nate doesn’t consciously choose 
to risk running the child over, his failure to pay adequate attention never-
theless manifests a quality of ill will. Naturally, it’s not as bad a quality 
of will as if he had harmed the child intentionally or knowingly, say. 
Nevertheless, failure to pay attention when one is engaged in activities 
that pose a risk of serious harm displays a lack of consideration for those 
who you risk harm to. So, Negligent Nate displays ill will toward the 
child, and is thus responsible for harming him. 
 I think these approaches fare no better than tracing in explaining re-
sponsibility in negligence cases. To see this, we first need an account of 
what it means for an action to “manifest” a quality of will. Unfortunately, 
the main proponents of these views say very little about what the “mani-
festing” relation is. As I see it, then, there are two main options: “mani-
                                                 
 12The classic statement is P.F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” reprinted in 
Gary Watson, Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 59-80, who speaks 
in terms of actions “reflecting” and “expressing” qualities of will (p. 63). Other devel-
oped quality of will accounts include Pete Graham, Blame, Determinism, and Ignorance 
(Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Philosophy, New York University, 2005), and R. Jay 
Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1994). Michael McKenna and Gary Watson endorse at least the core aspects of 
Strawson’s original approach in, respectively, “The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral 
Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism,” The Journal of Ethics 2 (1998): 
123-42, and “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil,” in Ferdinand Schoeman (ed.), Re-
sponsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 256-86. For a quality of will approach applied to 
responsibility for one’s attitudes, see Angela Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes: Activ-
ity and Passivity in Mental Life,” Ethics 115 (2005): 236-71. 
 13The following examples are from Smith, “Responsibility for Attitudes.” 
 14Ibid., p. 243. 
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fest” could be a causal relation or an evidential relation. There is textual 
evidence for either gloss. Some authors use “manifest” simultaneously 
with “express,” which often looks causal, but the use of the relation on 
these views is to draw inferences from actions to qualities of will. No 
matter our gloss, however, on neither understanding will quality of will 
approaches be able to explain negligence responsibility.15 Indeed, they 
both fail for the same reason. 
 One possible reading of “manifest” is as an evidential reading be-
cause the role it plays in the theory is to support inferences from actions 
to qualities of ill will. Unfortunately, on this reading, quality of will theo-
ries will fail to explain negligence responsibility. On the evidential read-
ing, we are supposed to think that Negligent Nate’s conduct evinces an 
ill quality of will. He should have paid more attention to what he was 
doing, and the fact that he didn’t is evidence that he doesn’t give the ap-
propriate consideration to those to whom he risks harm in operating a 
vehicle carelessly. But this conclusion is too strong. The power of the 
evidential relation surely rests on the reliability of the inference from 
conduct to ill qualities of will. The reliability of such an inference re-
quires, it seems, some regularity in its connections. Notice that in sketch-
ing the examples above I used words like “repeatedly” and “routinely.” 
Of course, any conduct can count as some evidence for the underlying 
quality of will, but we generally require more before we are justified in 
actually drawing the inference. In order to justifiably draw the inference, 
we need something like a pattern of response. But ascriptions of respon-
sibility in cases of negligence need not rest on regularities. In fact, such 
ascriptions can fly in the face of compelling additional evidence: Negli-
gent Nate could have at all times previously been the paragon of careful 
driving. This is counterevidence, it would seem, for thinking that in the 
particular case in question, Nate manifests ill will toward anyone, even 
the child. Nevertheless, one transgression is sufficient for negligence, 
and if negligence itself is to be sufficient for responsibility, then it seems 
that quality of will views (on the evidential reading) fare no better in ex-
plaining it, for the transgression itself won’t be sufficient evidence for an 
ill quality of will. 
 A perhaps more plausible reading of “manifests” is as a causal read-
ing, but unfortunately quality of will views will fail on such a reading for 
much the same reason. On this reading, we are supposed to think that 
Nate’s negligence, his failure to pay attention, is caused by some ill qual-
ity of will, either toward the child or in general. It seems to me we should 
be initially skeptical of such a claim, for Nate doesn’t even know the 
                                                 
 15For the remainder of the paper I will use “negligence responsibility” merely as con-
venient shorthand for “responsibility for the products of negligent conduct.” 
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child is there, or that anyone is there for that matter. Nor is he even con-
sciously thinking about backing up, so we might seriously doubt that his 
current frame of mind is such that his attitudes toward others, whatever 
they are, would be engaged to cause his lack of care. More importantly, 
however, Nate could very well hold quite positive attitudes toward the 
child he injures. Perhaps the child is a neighbor’s son, who mows Nate’s 
grass and shovels his sidewalk when it snows. Nate is very grateful for 
the son’s work, thinks him a fine young man, and so on. If this were the 
case, it would be hard to claim that Nate holds any ill will toward the 
child, much less that that ill will caused his failure to pay attention. In-
deed, it seems our causal judgments will be tied up again with the reli-
ability of our inferences from the conduct to the agent’s attitudes, and 
will therefore be subject to counterevidence of the above sort.16 
 No matter the gloss we give to “manifest,” quality of will approaches 
fare no better at explaining responsibility for negligently produced 
harms. Quality of will accounts seem to require some regularity of con-
duct. Repeatedly disregarding someone’s interests might count as suffi-
cient evidence for an ill quality of will, but a one-time offense would be 
insufficient. Compare again the case of the inconsiderate husband with a 
case of negligence like Nate’s. Filling in some details, the husband in 
question makes plans, chooses, and acts, usually with no concern for his 
wife’s interests, preferences, or values. He doesn’t purposely act contrary 
to his wife’s wishes; he just habitually fails to consider them. When he 
deliberates, facts about his wife’s interests simply don’t enter in as rea-
sons for or against his options. If we examine his actions, then, we are 
led to suppose that he doesn’t actually value his wife in a particular way. 
If he did, he wouldn’t continuously fail to factor her interests into his 
deliberations. This inference is supported by the copious evidence we 
have for the conclusion. In our context, it seems plain that the husband 
lacks concern for his wife, and this fact is apparent in the choices he 
makes and the actions he takes. For cases such as his, quality of will 
views look promising. Even though he doesn’t consciously disregard his 
wife’s interests, the fact that he disregards them at all seems to reveal 
something about his values and commitments. Moreover, the copious 
evidence we have makes more plausible the notion that when he fails to 
consider her interests he does so because of a lack of concern. 
 But Nate’s case is importantly different from the husband case. We 
don’t have copious evidence about Nate. We have a single instance of 
negligence. He fails to consider the risk he is posing to those behind him 
                                                 
 16I am not here suggesting that quality of will views require that actions be the prod-
uct of stable dispositions of character. My focus is on the relevant considerations for 
reasonably drawing inferences about an agent’s quality of will from his action, not on the 
causal connections themselves. 
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as he backs out of his driveway. But this is insufficient evidence for 
drawing the conclusion that Nate holds a lack of concern for those 
around him. If Nate had developed a habit of backing out without look-
ing, then matters would be different; then his case would look like the 
husband’s. But even without such regularity in conduct, Nate is negli-
gent. His lack of care suffices for that. So quality of will views cannot 
explain why his negligence is sufficient for responsibility because we 
don’t have sufficient reason to think Nate holds ill will toward anyone. 
This is especially true anytime we have counterevidence involving posi-
tive qualities of will. But once is enough for an ascription of responsibil-
ity in negligence cases. Even someone who in all other respects is the 
acme of consideration and care can be responsible for negligent conduct, 
it seems, should he fail to pay proper attention in just one instance. Qual-
ity of will accounts, therefore, even if they could explain responsibility in 
some cases of negligence, cannot explain responsibility across cases of 
negligence. 
 It might seem there’s a simpler response a quality of will proponent 
might make. One could claim that it is the lack of attention itself that 
constitutes the ill will in cases of negligence. Nate, for example, fails to 
consider the risk of harm he’s posing to others as he backs out, and it is 
this failure that constitutes his negative quality of will. Such a response is 
no doubt an attractive one for quality of will theorists to take, but it 
doesn’t really address the issue at hand. 
 The first problem with this answer is that it solves the matter only by 
fiat. We have just seen that we don’t have good evidence for an ill qual-
ity of will on Nate’s part. The solution on offer here simply lowers the 
bar for what we need in order to draw the inference. In short, the re-
sponse here suggests that Nate’s case can be treated just like the husband 
case: both involve lacks of consideration, and a single demonstration of 
such a lack licenses us to infer an ill quality of will. But this just can’t be 
right. A consultation with our own past experiences should be enough to 
see why. We don’t automatically ascribe ill quality of will to our friends 
who fail to consider our interests on one occasion, forgetting a birthday, 
say. We require more. Part of this reaction is surely that we have ample 
evidence of their good will for us. But while it may be the case that in the 
absence of such counterevidence, when we consider a case like Nate’s in 
a vacuum, we are more apt to make inferential leaps, it is equally appar-
ent that when given such counterevidence, the inference is all the more 
difficult to sustain. And if this is right, then quality of will views simply 
do not give the right explanation of responsibility in negligence cases. 
 The second problem with this response is that it fails to give us a gen-
eral explanation of responsibility across cases. It was supposed to show 
how negligent agents manifest qualities of ill will just like in paradig-
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matic cases. But the ill will doing the work in Nate’s case according to 
this last response isn’t the same as the ill will in Mad Max’s case of 
punching the bartender. In the latter case, there is clearly an “active” 
quality of ill will at work, one that is engaged and “expressed” in action. 
Indeed, it seems to play a causal/explanatory role. But in Nate’s case, 
according to this last response, his negligence constitutes the ill will. It is 
a “passive” ill will, one that is posited in order to give a verdict that ac-
cords with common sense.17 So we don’t have a general account of re-
sponsibility that can explain both cases together; we have two accounts, 
one for each. In this way, the view fares no better than any disjunctive 
account we could give. The model for such a view would go like this: A 
is responsible for x when he meets some set of conditions α (those ob-
taining in paradigmatic cases) OR when he meets some different set of 
conditions β (those obtaining in negligence cases). Disjunctive accounts, 
however, ignore the fact that in both cases the agent involved is supposed 
to be responsible for x. So if there’s something interesting to the notion 
that both are responsible, that both deserve certain treatment because 
they are responsible, we should want our theory to explain why this is so 
in a way that sheds light on this shared feature of the cases. We should 
want a general explanation. Quality of will views cannot accomplish this 
task, and so fail as a satisfactory explanation of negligence responsibility. 
 
 
4. Negligence as a Species of Inadvertence 
 
If I’m right, then, tracing fails as an explanation for responsibility for 
negligently produced outcomes. It fails because it requires tracing re-
sponsibility back to some conscious mental element, usually a choice or 
action. But negligence is defined by a lack of conscious mental states, an 
unconscious inattention, and there need be no choices or decisions that 
contribute to that inattention. Thus, tracing is unable to help us explain 
responsibility for negligently produced outcomes. If I’m right that no 
general explanation is available to cover cases of negligence, we are 
seemingly left with two options: either add ad hoc clauses to our theories 
to explain negligence responsibility as a special case, or drop the intui-
tive conclusion that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they 
produce. I argued in the previous section that the first option is unsatis-
factory. 
 The other option one can take is to reject the claim that Negligent 
                                                 
 17I should note that “active” quality of wills can still be described in terms of disposi-
tions, say, in the way that the husband counts as “callous” or “indifferent.” But to count 
as such one will still need a pattern of behavior (as in the husband’s case) or some aware-
ness of the situation (as in the case of intentional action). 
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Nate is responsible for the child’s injuries. If that were the case, then we 
should expect tracing to fail as an explanation. Indeed, no satisfactory 
explanation could be given that would cover such cases and paradigmatic 
cases of responsible actions. And as I will now argue, we actually have 
some reason to think that negligent agents are not responsible for the 
outcomes they produce because negligence seems indistinguishable from 
simple inadvertence from the perspective of responsibility, and inadver-
tence counts as an excuse. Explaining these cases together, then, pres-
sures us to treat negligence like inadvertence, and therefore either reject 
the claim that negligent agents are responsible for the harms they pro-
duce, or else accept that inadvertent agents are also responsible. I’ll ar-
gue that the second option is unattractive, and thus that negligent agents 
are not in fact responsible for the harms they bring about. Now it is likely 
the case that intuitions will still diverge about negligence cases and cases 
of inadvertence. That is, many will still judge negligent agents worse 
than their inadvertent counterparts. We can explain this fact, however, by 
reference to what does distinguish negligent agents from their inadver-
tent counterparts. It is a difference that I think will show why we tend to 
treat negligent agents more harshly, but it is not a difference that will 
actually demonstrate them to be responsible. I outline a model for such 
an explanation in section 5. 
 We know what Negligent Nate did, but let’s compare him with a new 
case. Leadfoot Lenny18 is at a party where a group of friends are gathered 
watching a movie. There are more people than seats, and some have got-
ten comfortable lying on the floor. Lenny gets up to get a soda from the 
fridge, and in the course of stepping around and over people, he inadver-
tently steps on his friend’s hand. He didn’t mean to step on his friend’s 
hand, but he was distracted by the movie, and so he did. Nevertheless, it 
seems Lenny’s responsibility in this case is undermined due to his inad-
vertence, which makes his stepping on the hand unintentional. 
 We seem to treat negligence as preserving responsibility, whereas 
inadvertence seems to undermine it. But if this is the case, then there 
must be a way of distinguishing between Nate’s case and Lenny’s in a 
way that explains why Nate is responsible and Lenny is not. Otherwise, 
we’re forced to conclude that either negligence does undermine respon-
sibility, or else inadvertence doesn’t undermine responsibility. I think the 
latter disjunct is far more problematic than the first, and I’ll defend this 
claim at the end of the section. First I want to demonstrate that there is no 
satisfactory way to distinguish between Nate and Lenny that indicates a 
difference in responsibility. 
                                                 
 18Lenny’s name here, like Nate’s, does not reveal a character trait, but makes clear 
the facts of the case. 
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 An initial observation about cases of negligence is that they involve a 
failure to do something the agent should have done; negligent agents 
should have paid more attention. We say, “Nate should have looked 
where he was going.” Unfortunately, such claims are ambiguous. There 
are two possible interpretations for how to treat the “should have,” and 
each interpretation seems to fail to distinguish properly between Negli-
gent Nate and Leadfoot Lenny. On the first interpretation, the “should 
have” means simply that it would have been better had Nate done what 
he failed to do. It would have been better had Nate looked because then 
the child wouldn’t have been hit. The problem with this first interpreta-
tion is that, while true of Nate’s case, it is equally true of Lenny’s case. It 
would have been better if Lenny had been more careful, because then his 
friend wouldn’t have gotten his hand stepped on. So the first interpreta-
tion fails to distinguish between the cases at all. 
 On the second, more plausible, interpretation, the “should have” re-
fers to some sort of standard that was violated.19 We require individuals 
to look when they back out of driveways (in part because we expect them 
to recognize the dangers posed by operating vehicles). Moreover, this 
seems to be an instance of a general duty to take extra care when engag-
ing in activities that pose a risk of harm (or, perhaps, just a standing duty 
to take care in our conduct). The problem on this second interpretation is 
that we can always ask why supposedly nonresponsible counterparts 
(like Lenny) aren’t under a similar sort of standing duty. Navigating 
around people lying on the floor poses a risk of harm. If a standing duty 
is sufficient for securing responsibility, then Lenny would seem to be 
responsible as well. While our expectations are surely stronger in Negli-
gent Nate’s case, this seems insufficient for setting negligence cases 
apart as a distinct class of cases with respect to responsibility. After all, a 
standing duty governing a given activity applies to all those who engage 
in the relevant activity. But the relevant requirement here isn’t driving 
carefully. If it were, it wouldn’t apply to negligent agents whose negli-
gence has nothing to do with driving, like a bricklayer who tosses defec-
tive bricks off a rooftop without looking.20 But the bricklayer seems neg-
ligent in the same way as Nate is: he should have paid more attention to 
the harm he risked. And even if we have scores of standing duties finely 
                                                 
 19Compare H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), who grants that inadvertence implies a 
“blank” state of mind to the consequences of one’s actions even when negligent, but ar-
gues that negligence lies not in inadvertence but in failing to live up to some objective 
standard. See also Claire Finkelstein, “Responsibility for Unintended Consequences,” 
Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 2 (2005): 579-99. 
 20This example is from Hart, Punishment and Responsibility, and is often reused in 
discussions of negligence in legal theory. See also Finkelstein, “Responsibility for Unin-
tended Consequences,” and Zimmerman, “Negligence and Moral Responsibility.” 
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individuated by activity, so that there’s one governing driving, and an-
other governing bricklaying, and another governing firing a gun, and so 
on, this is only because they fall out of a quite general standing duty to 
take care in everything we do. 
 It might be thought that satisfying the standard may require different 
thresholds of care depending on the specific activity. So, when one is 
driving or bricklaying on a roof, one needs to take special care, but not 
when one is walking around prone people on the way to getting a soda. 
I’m not convinced that this is really a demand for more care than in 
Lenny’s hand-stepping case, and not just a different side of the same 
point about driving and bricklaying on a roof having the potential for 
more harm than stepping around prone people.21 That is, it seems to me 
that a demand for more care in a given activity is really just a statement 
that the activity is more dangerous. Nevertheless, even if we think you do 
have to be more careful in certain situations, this wouldn’t distinguish 
between the cases on grounds that evince a difference in responsibility. 
For the mere violation of a standing duty of care wouldn’t suffice to 
show that an agent is responsible for the effects of such a violation. And 
if it did, Leadfoot Lenny would be responsible too. 
 If negligence and inadvertence are indistinguishable from the per-
spective of responsibility, then I think we’re forced to conclude either 
that (a) negligent agents aren’t responsible for the harms they cause, or 
(b) inadvertent agents are responsible for the harms they cause. In short, 
either both Nate and Lenny are responsible or neither is. In favor of (a), I 
think it true that inadvertence seems to count as a consideration that un-
dermines responsibility precisely because it involves the lack of a con-
scious mental element. When one does something only inadvertently, it 
is an unintentional result, one the individual didn’t mean to bring about. 
Thus, it seems a mistake to think that such a result reflects on the agent 
in a way such that we can evaluate the agent by the inadvertent out-
come’s lights. It doesn’t seem as if the agent deserves any sort of treat-
ment on the basis that outcome. In short, he isn’t responsible for it. 
 But what about (b)? Some might be attracted to the view that Lenny 
and Nate are both responsible for the harms they bring about. After all, 
we might say the same things to both: “Watch where you’re going!” or 
                                                 
 21It has been suggested to me that we license people for driving (Nate), whereas we 
don’t license people for stepping around prone people (Lenny). This is true, no doubt in 
large part because of the importance we place on driving. It is obvious that such activities 
pose the risk of especially serious harm, more so than stepping around prone people. But 
I don’t think this amounts to a claim about demanding more care in such instances, but 
rather a certification that those we license can demonstrate those skills that constitute 
taking care in the circumstances germane to the activity. Plus, the costs of requiring and 
regulating licenses are worth it, given the seriousness of the potential harm. This isn’t the 
case in the matter of prone-people-stepping. 
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“You’re supposed to pay attention to what you’re doing!” Indeed, one 
convinced by my argument that negligence and inadvertence are really 
indistinguishable from the perspective of responsibility might well point 
to the shared standing duty of care and claim that the symmetrical viola-
tions by Nate and Lenny suggest that they are both responsible. One who 
is attracted to such a position, however, still faces a significant hurdle: 
the explanation for such responsibility still won’t explain responsibility 
in paradigmatic cases. It is worth remembering that if negligence and 
inadvertence are indistinguishable from the perspective of responsibility, 
then both will require exceptional explanations since both are character-
ized by the absence of a conscious element. It should also be apparent 
that just as tracing won’t work for negligence, it won’t work for inadver-
tence either. 
 Moreover, a view that claimed that inadvertent agents, too, were re-
sponsible, would seem to yield the wrong result in cases of praiseworthi-
ness. An agent who brings about some good outcome inadvertently 
surely isn’t praiseworthy for it, no matter how great the good achieved. 
And even if there are important differences between praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness, it doesn’t seem as if an agent who brings about 
some good inadvertently is even responsible for it, claims of praise aside. 
So while insisting that both negligent and inadvertent agents are respon-
sible is an available option, I think such a claim both conflicts with a 
natural view about inadvertence and gets us no closer to explaining re-
sponsibility in either case. 
 
 
5. Preserving a Distinction 
 
Comparing negligence with inadvertence leads me to suspect that negli-
gent agents really aren’t responsible for the outcomes they bring about. 
But why does the intuition that Negligent Nate is responsible seem so 
strong? Why does negligence still seem importantly different from mere 
inadvertence? Well, one important difference between Nate’s case and 
Lenny’s is that Nate causes much more harm. A broken leg is much 
worse than a trod-upon hand (we’re assuming the hand isn’t broken). 
Additionally, there’s only so much harm you can cause by inattentively 
walking around prone people, whereas the risk of serious injury by inat-
tentively operating a car is much greater. But it doesn’t seem to me that 
considerations such as these can support differing judgments of respon-
sibility. First, I’ll defend this claim, and then I’ll show how these consid-
erations may yet help explain our differing reactions to the cases, and in 
turn distinguish between negligence and inadvertence themselves. 
 I don’t think the severity of the harm caused can make a difference to 
responsibility. Suppose you knew that an agent caused some harm en-
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tirely by mistake, by making an entirely reasonable choice, say. If you 
were convinced that the agent wasn’t responsible, would the fact that it 
was a serious harm make a difference? To put the point generally, sup-
pose we take a case in which it’s obvious an agent isn’t responsible and 
then ratchet up the seriousness of the harm brought about. Is there a 
threshold in which responsibility “appears”? I find the very suggestion to 
be implausible. 
 One reason to think it’s implausible surfaces if we compare paradigm 
cases of responsibility. So, suppose Deirdre hates Emma and wants her 
to suffer. So Deidre waits for Emma to get off work, sneaks up behind 
her in the parking lot and beats her with a baseball bat. Emma suffers 
multiple contusions, a cracked skull, and a concussion. Deidre is respon-
sible for Emma’s injuries if anyone ever is. Now suppose that Fran hates 
Ginny and wants her to suffer. So Fran waits for Ginny to get off work, 
sneaks up behind her in the parking lot and pulls down her pants, causing 
Ginny to trip and fall. Ginny skins her knees and is humiliated. Fran, too, 
seems responsible for Ginny’s injuries if anyone ever is. Indeed, in com-
parison, Deidre and Fran seem equally responsible for their respective 
harms. The paradigm of responsible action is cases of intentional action 
(by ordinary agents) aimed at a particular outcome as the intended end. 
Deidre and Fran’s actions fit the bill. Both are out solely to harm (in dif-
ferent ways) their targets, and this is precisely what they do. In fact, I 
don’t see how one could be more responsible for some outcome than 
they are in their respective scenarios. 
 It should be apparent, however, that the harm done to Emma is much 
worse than the harm done to Ginny. Indeed, Deidre is certainly more 
blameworthy than Fran for what she does precisely because the harm 
Deidre brings about is so much worse.22 But the amount of harm brought 
about isn’t pertinent to the ladies’ responsibility for bringing it about. 
Both are equally responsible in their respective scenarios. So, while the 
amount of harm brought about is certainly relevant for how blameworthy 
an agent is, it isn’t relevant to her responsibility for bringing it about. 
That’s why Deidre and Fran are both equally responsible for their respec-
tive harms, even while Deidre is more blameworthy for her harm than 
Fran is for hers. 
 This result can be applied to Nate’s situation. First, let’s change the 
case slightly, and let’s call the new Nate, Nate*. Suppose everything is as 
before, but instead of not seeing the child, he doesn’t see a child’s bike. 
                                                 
 22There may be other relevant factors in play here. We may judge Deidre more 
blameworthy overall because we also think it’s worse to intend to physically assault 
someone than to harass them a bit. But I want to limit the discussion above to compara-
tive judgments regarding blameworthiness for what they do, blameworthiness for particu-
lar mental states notwithstanding. 
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So Nate* runs over a child’s bike. This is a much less serious harm than 
what Nate brings about. Is Nate* less responsible for running over the 
child’s bike? I don’t think so. Responsibility ascriptions seem impor-
tantly insulated from the amount of harm caused, as Deidre and Fran 
showed. So I think the answer one gives should match whatever one 
thinks about Nate’s case, and the same goes if Nate* runs over a prized 
rosebush or three hundred nuns. Since we should treat these cases alike, 
and I think Nate* isn’t responsible, Nate isn’t responsible either. 
 Now we have an explanation for our differing reactions to Negligent 
Nate and Leadfoot Lenny. We tend to treat Nate more harshly because 
his failure of the standing duty of care is worse than Lenny’s. Interest-
ingly, this difference can also be used to distinguish between negligence 
and inadvertence. We can understand this comparison in terms of the 
amount of harm risked by the activity each is engaged in. I am assuming 
here that the probability of harm is equivalent in these two cases. The 
reader is invited to tweak the example suitably if the reader doubts that 
the probabilities are in fact the same.23 This assumption will be important 
below. Now, Nate is operating a vehicle, which poses the risk for quite 
serious harm. Driving a vehicle carelessly can kill multiple people; and 
this is a serious harm indeed. Lenny’s activity, while it does risk harm, 
risks a much more minor amount of harm. One could dislocate a finger 
or perhaps even break a bone by having one’s hand stepped on, but these 
are fairly minor harms. This comparison helps explain what distinguishes 
Nate’s negligence from Lenny’s simple inadvertence. The difference can 
be highlighted by reference to the expected negative value of the harms 
risked by engaging in such activities without due care. In both cases, the 
agent fails a standard of care. Indeed, as experience will reveal, we 
would admonish both Lenny and Nate for their failures. “Watch where 
you’re going!” we might snap. And in keeping with my story for our re-
actions to Nate, this response also has as its source the general standing 
duty of care, and our providing it serves to reinforce that standard (and 
hopefully encourages Lenny to be more careful in the future). But driv-
ing vehicles poses a much more serious risk of harm because the sorts of 
harms that could result if one doesn’t satisfy the standard are so much 
worse. Thus, Nate’s violation is worse; it more severely flouts the duty to 
avoid harm by engaging in a more dangerous activity without being suf-
ficiently careful. 
 However, this isn’t the only way to fail the standing duty of care. The 
line between Nate and Lenny (and thus between negligence and inadver-
tence) is drawn by the expected negative value of the harm risked with-
                                                 
 23We could do this artificially by example, but the examples would be contrived. I 
prefer to assume the equivalence of probability and work with more ordinary examples. 
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out due care. But there are two ways one can increase the expected nega-
tive value of the harm. The first way, as demonstrated by comparing 
Nate and Lenny, is to increase the amount of harm risked by the activity. 
Driving vehicles risks more harm than stepping around prone people. So 
Nate is negligent because the expected negative value of driving without 
due care is too high, because driving without due care poses a certain risk 
of very serious harm. Lenny is inadvertent and acts without due care, but 
the negative expected value of his conduct is relatively low, given the 
amount of harm risked. 
 The other way to increase the expected negative value of the harm, 
however, is to increase the risk of harm; that is, to engage in riskier ac-
tivities. For example, shooting one’s firearm without care in the middle 
of Montana risks a certain amount of harm (e.g., a gunshot wound that 
could lead to death). Shooting one’s firearm without care in the middle 
of Manhattan risks the same amount of harm, but it poses a much higher 
risk of that harm actually occurring. The chances that you will shoot 
someone in the middle of Montana are quite slim when compared to 
shooting someone in the middle of Manhattan. So, failing the standard in 
Manhattan, in this instance, is worse than failing it in Montana. It also 
seems to me that in the very unlikely event that the Montana shooter in-
jured someone, this would seem to be a case of inadvertent shooting, 
whereas if the Manhattan shooter injured someone, he would do so neg-
ligently.24 
 This verdict matches natural reactions to these cases, I think, and cap-
tures what is essential in distinguishing negligence from inadvertence. 
Negligence involves the failure to pay appropriate attention when the 
expected negative value of the risked harms meets or exceeds some 
threshold. Inadvertence involves the same sort of inattentiveness, but the 
negative expected value of the harm risked is much lower. When one’s 
carelessness increases the negative expected value of the harm risked too 
much, that agent is negligent. This means that for all I’ve said the Mon-
tana shooter may also be negligent. Similarly, there may be cases like 
Nate’s that don’t qualify as negligence. For example, if Norene lives in 
rural Virginia and is backing out of her driveway without looking, where 
she is 10 miles from her nearest neighbor, where kids don’t walk to 
school, and it’s 5 a.m., perhaps she is only inadvertent, even if she hit a 
child. I happen to think that this is probably not right, and the explana-
tion for this fact is that driving without due care always increases the 
negative expected value to unacceptable levels. Nevertheless, these cases 
                                                 
 24If it helps, we can suppose that both are shooting at soda cans they’ve propped up 
100 ft. away. Here, the confines and population of Manhattan make it much more likely 
that the Manhattan shooter will hit someone if he’s not careful. Indeed, it may be that no 
amount of care could keep a bystander from being shot. 
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help illustrate how negligence is a form of inadvertence, one in which the 
expected negative value of the inattentive conduct is too great. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper I hope to have accomplished three objectives. First, the un-
conscious nature of negligence poses a deep and interesting problem for 
all theories of responsibility, one that isn’t solved by tracing, the main 
tool in the literature for handling similar cases. The problem is that ex-
planations of responsibility need to extend across cases of responsibility, 
but the difference between negligence cases and paradigm cases of action 
seems too big a gulf for a single explanation to span. Second, negli-
gence’s similarity to inadvertence puts pressure on theories to treat both 
on a par. And since inadvertence seems to excuse agents from responsi-
bility, this fact suggests that negligent agents, too, are not responsible. 
Finally, I proposed an alternative model for distinguishing between neg-
ligence and inadvertence, which explains them in terms of a shared inat-
tentiveness and the expected negative value of the potential conse-
quences of the conduct. 
 Of course, this means the alternative model rejects the claim that neg-
ligent agents are responsible for the harms they bring about. But given 
the fact that negligence is characterized by the absence of a conscious 
mental element and moral responsibility seemingly depends on such an 
element, this denial is merely a consequence of the problem with negli-
gence. Furthermore, the alternative model captures a natural explanation 
of our reactions to cases of negligence, and perhaps more importantly, 
our differing reactions to inadvertent agents. Given tracing’s failure to 
explain negligence, and the general worry that no general explanation 
could be given for negligence, I’m forced to conclude that negligent 
agents are not responsible for the harms they bring about.25 
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